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the January 2013 Elections
On 22 January 2013, the Israelis held the early leg-
islative elections that Prime Minister Benjamin Net-
anyahu had wished for. While hitherto enjoying a 
stable political majority (66 MPs out of 120), he de-
cided to make use of his relatively widespread popu-
larity to strengthen his party’s parliamentary pres-
ence, particularly before difficult budget decisions. 
Ultimately, he only partially succeeded in this aim. 
Certainly, in March 2013, Netanyahu was appointed 
Prime Minister for the third time, thus becoming the 
politician to remain at the head of the Israeli govern-
ment the longest after David Ben Gurion. This politi-
cal longevity is quite an accomplishment in and of 
itself, considering the high parliamentary volatility 
characterising the Israeli democracy. The fact re-
mains, however, that the electoral strategy of 
strengthening the Likud party failed, and the results 
held some surprises.
With the elections in perspective, Benjamin Netan-
yahu had forged an alliance with the Russian-speak-
ing party, Yisrael Beiteinu, headed by the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Avigdor Lieberman.2 The aim was to 
expand their joint constituency. However, the inverse 
occurred: from 42 seats in the Knesset before elec-
tions, they went down to 31. This decline can be 
attributed to the fact that the electoral union dis-
pleased two Likud constituency groups: on the one 
hand, liberal right voters, because the unified list was 
undeniably deeply anchored in militant nationalism; 
and on the other hand, traditionalist voters, who did 
not at all appreciate the “secular” image of the Rus-
sian-speaking party. Suddenly, the Likud had lost 
centre and right-wing votes, a loss that benefited the 
centre party Yesh Atid (“There is a Future”), led by 
the journalist Yair Lapid (19 seats) and Naftali Ben-
nett’s The Jewish Home (12 seats). These two par-
ties were the revelations of the elections.
Though the success of Yair Lapid’s party had been 
anticipated by surveys, its extent was not. This is 
most likely due to the mobilisation of the middle 
class, essentially secular Israelis overwhelmed by 
the disproportionate load of taxes and military con-
scription they bear. This is the same middle class 
that protested massively over the summer of 2011 in 
the “tent movement” to demand greater social jus-
tice, and more particularly the regulation of real es-
tate prices and the reduction of direct taxes.
Besides social concerns, the second motivation 
that led voters to choose Yesh Atid was the grow-
ing sense of injustice in the face of generous ex-
emptions from military service for ultra-orthodox 
Jews. Whereas secular and nationalist-religious 
Israelis, if they are men, spend three years serving 
in the military and then carry out periods in the re-
serve until they are forty, 55,000 students of the 
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1 He has published Le conflit israélo-arabe (Armand Colin, 2011) and edited The Routledge Handbook of Modern Israel (Routledge, 2013). By 
the same token, he has also co-edited, together with Frédéric Charillon, the annual publication Afrique du Nord/Moyen-Orient published by La 
Documentation Française.
2 Lieberman resigned from his post in mid-December 2012, after being charged with fraud and embezzlement in a case involving companies in 
Belarus.
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institutes of Talmudic studies are exempt from mili-
tary obligations by virtue of an old agreement from 
1948. This general exemption means that the bur-
den of military service is not shared equally. Moreo-
ver, since the exemption requires them to dedicate 
themselves wholly to the study of the Torah, young 
ultra-orthodox Jews are not allowed to work but de-
pend on various types of social aid funded by the 
State budget.
Besides social concerns, the second 
motivation that led voters to choose 
Yesh Atid was the growing sense of 
injustice in the face of generous 
exemptions from military service for 
ultra-orthodox Jews
The second revelation of the elections, The Jewish 
Home, shares Yesh Atid’s concern for equality. What 
distinguishes it is its highly nationalist message: it is 
in favour of the annexation of the entire Zone C (60% 
of the West Bank territory still under Israeli control), 
which explains how it garnered a great deal of sup-
port in West Bank settlements. In any case, The 
Jewish Home has managed to expand its following 
well beyond this ideological constituency by luring 
voters, even along the Mediterranean coast, who are 
attracted by the “high-tech entrepreneur” facet of 
the party’s new leader, Naftali Bennett, from a family 
of American immigrants.
In view of the election results, Benjamin Netanyahu 
has formed a coalition government gathering Yesh 
Atid, The Jewish Home and the centre party Hatnua, 
led by former Foreign Affairs Minister Tzipi Livni, 
around the Likud party. Its immediate task will be 
threefold: start working on enlisting ultra-orthodox 
Jews; devise an institutional reform to reduce parlia-
mentary fragmentation; implement a budget of aus-
terity. The latter measure will entail budget cuts, in-
cluding for the defence ministry, so as to check the 
growth of public deficit (4.2% of the GDP in 2012). 
On the other hand, the relaunching of negotiations 
with the Palestinian Authority – at an impasse for 
years now – stands little chance of being a priority. 
There are two reasons for this: first of all, the coali-
tion partners are divided, Yair Lapid being in favour 
of the solution of two States, which Naftali Bennett 
rejects; and secondly, the rather alarming regional 
context is hardly conducive to bold advances.
Growing risk of regional Isolation
Israeli-Palestinian Deadlock
On 14 November 2012, Israel launched Operation 
Pillar of Defence after further deterioration of the 
Gaza Strip situation. The launching of this military 
campaign demonstrated that, four years after Oper-
ation Cast Lead, nothing had really been settled be-
tween Israel and Hamas. After 1,500 air raids car-
ried out by Israeli aviation against rocket launchers, 
weapons workshops and official buildings while Ha-
mas launched 1,500 rockets and missiles against 
Israel (for the first time including Tel Aviv and Jerusa-
lem), the “mini-war” came to a close, eight days lat-
er, with a new cease-fire maintaining a fragile status 
quo.
While Israel was engaged in a military wrestling 
match with Hamas, a more subdued political strug-
gle was being carried out by Tel Aviv vis-à-vis the 
Palestinian Authority (PA). In an attempt to break the 
persistent stalemate, Mahmoud Abbas chose to 
bring the case of Palestine before the international 
community, obtaining Palestine’s non-member ob-
server status with the UN (November 2012). This 
symbolic victory did not, however, change anything 
in practice, as the Israeli government demonstrated 
by taking double retaliation, i.e. launching new plan-
ning and construction programmes (including in 
Zone E-1, to the east of Jerusalem), and temporarily 
freezing the transfer of taxes collected by Israel on 
behalf of the PA. Through these gestures, Netanya-
hu wished to indicate that no Palestinian State would 
see the light without Israel’s consent.
Can we expect a relaunch of negotiations during 
Barack Obama’s second term? In principle, an 
American president free from the concern of re-
election can afford to be bolder, but it is not certain 
that Obama will take this path, since he was al-
ready deeply involved in the Israeli-Palestinian 
question at the beginning of his first term without 
obtaining significant results. During his official visit 
to the Middle East in March of 2013, he was, 
moreover, very careful not to announce any action 
Pa
no
ra
m
a
G
eo
gr
ap
hi
ca
l O
ve
rv
ie
w
 | 
M
id
dl
e 
E
as
t 
an
d 
Tu
rk
ey
IE
M
ed
. M
ed
ite
rr
an
ea
n 
Ye
ar
bo
ok
 2
01
3
19
5
plan whatsoever. The only tangible gain is the an-
nouncement of the official reconciliation between 
Tel Aviv and Ankara after a nearly three-year falling 
out pursuant to the interception by the Israeli navy 
of a Turkish ship seeking to break the naval block-
ade on Gaza (nine Turkish activists were killed dur-
ing the assault). This announced rapprochement 
clearly owes a great deal to the deep transforma-
tions taking place in the region, which are a matter 
of concern for both Turkey and Israel.
A Disquieting Arab Spring
The end of the Mubarak regime constituted a stra-
tegic loss for Israel. Although political disagree-
ments had not been lacking over the thirty years of 
Mubarak’s presidency, the two countries, tied by 
an alliance with the United States, shared the same 
concern for confining the influence of Islamist forc-
es. The revolution in Egypt has had very rapid ef-
fects. The deterioration of the security situation on 
the Sinai Peninsula, a phenomenon that is not new, 
has accelerated during the chaotic transition 
stage, under the action of activist groups involving 
Bedouins and Palestinians. In addition, the pipeline 
carrying gas to Israel – which covers 40% of the 
country’s needs – was sabotaged several times, 
interrupting the gas supply and finally leading to the 
complete suspension of supplies in April 2012.3 
Finally, the rise to power of Islamist forces in Egypt, 
symbolised by the election of Mohammed Morsi as 
President in June 2012, has modified the situation 
for Hamas in Gaza, which now has a political ally in 
Cairo. The context has thus undeniably changed for 
Israel, even if the new Egypt has succeeded in 
demonstrating pragmatism by maintaining diplo-
matic relations with Tel Aviv. This prudence was 
also perfectly illustrated by the active role Cairo 
played in the declaration of the ceasefire after last 
November’s “mini-war” in Gaza.
Apart from the case of Egypt, the developments in 
Syria are, of course, a central concern. Under the 
leadership of the Assads, Syria has often attempted 
to counter Israel’s regional ambitions. In this regard, 
the downfall of the regime would represent an unde-
niable strategic gain in many regards (end of the al-
liance with Teheran, weakening of Hezbollah). At the 
same time, Israeli leaders are well aware that the end 
of Baathist Syria could be accompanied by pro-
longed chaos, with destabilising regional effects. 
Syria under the Assads was an obstinate adversary 
of Israel but understood the power relations quite 
well and was always careful not to cross certain red 
lines (in particular on the military level). What will 
happen tomorrow in the “new Syria”?
The downfall of the regime would 
represent an undeniable strategic 
gain in many regards. At the same 
time, Israeli leaders are aware that 
the end of Baathist Syria could be 
accompanied by prolonged chaos
The developments in Jordan are likewise followed 
with attention. The Hashemite Kingdom is, in fact, 
together with Egypt, the only Arab State to have 
signed a peace treaty with Israel. Though King Ab-
dullah has managed to date to stem agitation in his 
kingdom, the extremely limited reforms he has intro-
duced have not appeased the political opposition. 
A long-term weakening of the monarchy would 
have very direct negative consequences for Israel, 
given the close ties between the two banks of the 
River Jordan.
On the whole, Israeli decision-makers, like a large 
part of public opinion, do not see the developments 
in the Middle East in a very positive light. Friendly 
regimes have been swept away (Egypt) or weak-
ened (Jordan) whereas when fair elections are or-
ganised, the Islamists take the day, which inevitably 
leads to the adoption of a more critical posture to-
wards Israel and a distancing. For Israel, the Arab 
Spring means greater isolation in the Middle East 
at a time when the Iranian nuclear question remains 
unresolved.
3 In April 2013, Israel began tapping the underwater Tamar gas field (whose reserves are estimated at 238 billion cubic metres), putting the coun-
try on the road towards energy independence.
